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Abstract: This article compares the performance of selected South African microcredit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have a poverty-alleviation
focus against various benchmarks drawn from the MicroBanking Bulletin.
Donors, governments, and many analysts regard sustainability as the benchmark
of microfinance institutions’ (MFIs) performance. However, the most relevant
question is whether microcredit NGOs are doing as well as they can in their
context. Of particular contextual importance is income inequality in a society.
South Africa has the world’s second worst income inequality, after neighbouring
Botswana. This creates a situation in which microcredit NGOs must recover
“First World” costs, particularly salaries, from revenues based on clients who can
only afford loans on a par with Third World countries. Compounding this situation
are structural obstacles to microenterprise in South Africa, as well as obstacles to
productivity in microcredit NGOs. Taken together, this creates a “salary burden”
for South African microcredit NGOs, which is the highest in the world according
to relevant benchmarks. South African MFI managers face significant obstacles to
improving productivity to compensate for the divergence between staff and client
living levels. These include an inadequate skills base, the small scale of the market,
rapid labor turnover, and limited resources for capacity development. South
African MFIs face the options of moving upmarket (which many have done),
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adopting methodological innovation or new product development, or closing. Of
these, there is a strong argument to be made for supported savings and credit
approaches as an alternative to NGO-based microcredit. Such an approach has the
advantages of greater voluntary input and social capital formation.

T

he question of sustainability in microcredit is a subject of
ongoing debate. The dominant view is what some call the
“Ohio State” school of thought, which is advocated at the
university of the same name in the United States. Broadly, this view
espouses a market-led, full cost-recovery approach to microcredit,
with no subsidies. It holds that sustainability is essential for two
reasons. First, the goal of microcredit practice should be to extend
the reach of commercial financial markets to the poor and excluded.
This requires that microfinance institutions (MFIs) perform well
enough to be able to access commercial wholesale finance, preferably
sooner rather than later. Second, sustainability is necessary to prevent
MFIs from concealing bad practice with ongoing subsidies. (For the
purposes of this article, sustainability is defined as: Coverage of
administrative cost + Loan loss + Cost of funds + Inflation +
Capitalization for growth from operating income.)
It is certainly reasonable to ask that the social cost-benefit ratio of
resources directed to microcredit interventions should be at least as
good as if those resources were applied differently, or even given away
(Schriener & Yaron, 2001). There is little point in subsidizing MFIs if
the returns for doing so are not at least the same as for alternative
uses—over an appropriate period and including “externalities,” i.e.,
nonfinancial impacts on clients and their communities.
For such calculations, absolute sustainability can be established
empirically and easily—an MFI either is or is not sustainable. In
most cases, however, the question is relative: How sustainable is an
MFI compared with other MFIs? Is it headed towards or away from
sustainability, and why? Most importantly, for our purposes, is the
MFI doing as well as can be expected given the circumstances?
Ted Baumann is Coordinator of the Community Finance Network (CMN) and Director
of the Bay Research and Consultancy Services, Muizenberg, South Africa. Email address:
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This last question is rarely raised. In particular, discussions
about MFI sustainability performance often ignore national-level
specifics. Donors, governments, and analysts routinely compare
MFIs in different countries to each other, telling MFI managers
what norms they “should” be able to achieve. Yet, as not all variables
affecting sustainability are under the control of MFI managers, we
should be prepared to ask whether an MFI is doing the best it can
in its context.
Such a perspective is needed because any microcredit model
involves a number of variables, both internal and external. For
example, an MFI might vary with the size of a loan group, interest
rates, or its incentive policy (internal variables). Or, it may be constrained by national laws, economic and labor market conditions, or
political instability (external variables). Some aspects of comparative
performance against international benchmarks are under an MFI’s
control; others may be determined by external factors that are not.
There is also interplay between the two. MFI managers’ decisions
about things they can control may be shaped decisively by contextual
factors they cannot control.
In assessing MFI performance towards sustainability, it is particularly important to take into account the level of income
inequality in a society. In some contexts, it might be difficult or
impossible to deliver poverty-oriented microcredit services, because
the socially determined costs—principally personnel costs—of
running a competent MFI are excessive relative to the income levels
of client microenterprises and therefore their borrowing capacity.

Purpose of the Article
With this in mind, the article addresses the matter of context in
South Africa. It investigates three issues:
• First, it compares the efficiency indicators of four South African
microcredit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), all of
which target poor and very poor households with solidarity
group-lending methodologies, with relevant international
benchmarks drawn from the MicroBanking Bulletin (MBB).
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(“Poor” households are defined as those living at or below the
unofficial but most commonly used South African poverty line,
which was about US$67 per person per month at the time of
the research in 2002. “Very poor” households are those that
have access to half or less than this.)
• Second, it identifies contextual factors that undermine the ability of South African MFIs to match such benchmarks.
• Third, it considers implications for South African MFIs, the
government, and donors.

Methodology
The MicroBanking Bulletin has provided useful benchmarking tables
on the global microcredit industry for some years now and is
updated biannually. The definitions underlying the MBB data have
been used to gather comparable data on South African MFIs. The
main point of comparison is with other African MFIs, particularly
those that are small scale and serve a low-income target market.
Comparisons are also made with MFIs elsewhere by size (medium to
small), methodology (solidarity group), and target market (low
income).

The South African Microcredit Context
One of the most important external variables confronting South
African MFIs is the country’s extreme income inequality. Although
South Africa’s per capita gross national income (GNI) of
US$2,820 1 puts the country in the middle-income band globally,
this conceals enormous variation in income distribution. The Gini
coefficient is currently about 0.65, which makes South Africa one
of the most unequal societies on the planet. The figure improved
somewhat after the first democratic elections of 1994. Its relapse
since then, however, is linked to a steep rise in unemployment and
poorly paid employment. This has been driven by industrial and trade
policies designed to improve global competitiveness and a macroeconomic policy emphasizing low inflation and a small government
deficit in order to attract foreign capital.
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South Africa’s Dualistic Economy
The chief cause and manifestation of South Africa’s radical income
inequality is the dualism of the economy. An economically “advanced”
and globally integrated minority, black and white, coexists with a
dependent and marginalized majority, almost entirely black. In
South Africa, these are known as the “first” and “second” economies.
While the former enjoys a human development index comparable to
that in southern Europe, the second economy lives at a level comparable to that in South Asia.
The material basis of this dualism is both historical and structural. Unlike peasantries elsewhere in Africa, South Africa’s rural
poor lack access to basic means of production, such as land, because
of unresolved issues of comprehensive settler dispossession. They live
in crowded rural villages squeezed between commercial farmland
(no longer exclusively white) and tourist-oriented game reserves. In
the urban areas, opportunities for self-employment are severely
constrained by South Africa’s manufacturing and retail sectors, the
most advanced in Africa, which relegate small-scale trading and
manufacturing to the margins.
Because of their lack of access to productive resources, South
Africa’s poor are almost totally dependent for their survival on the
output of the formal economy. The things that sustain and enhance
life are only available as commodities. The poor, however, are structurally excluded from access to the cash necessary to obtain these.
One outcome of this situation is poor households’ dependence on
state transfer payments, such as pensions, disability and childcare
grants, and inter- and intra-household transfers. This is especially
marked in rural areas. Another result is a high incidence of predatory
economic crime.
Microenterprise in South Africa
For most of South Africa’s “second economy” poor, microenterprise
means small-scale trading/hawking, personal services, and production of specialty items. However, South Africa’s efficient formal manufacturing and retail sectors severely constrain opportunities to add
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value and accumulate capital in such informal activities. Small-scale
traders capture only the tiny sliver of value arising from transport cost
differentials and convenience purchasing, because most low-income
households’ requirements can be obtained from formal shops.
Informal clothing manufacturers add value by producing items
required in small quantities, which are thus unattractive to formal
manufacturers, such as school uniforms. Some informal manufacturers in the ex-Bantustan areas take advantage of value versus volume
transportation issues to produce bulky or heavy but low-value
building materials, such as window and doorframes, or furniture,
but rapid improvement in transport infrastructure is undermining
this opportunity. Amongst the most rewarding (legal) informal
occupations in South Africa are brewing traditional beer, best produced in small batches and consumed fresh; tavern keeping; and
hairdressing.
South Africa’s informal traders, service providers, and manufacturers are also constrained by the lack of cash in their communities.
Most customers and clients of South African informal microenterprises are dependent on state transfer payments, inter-household
transfers, and informal microenterprise for their cash incomes. Cash
cycles tend to be monthly, with a fresh influx at pension/child care
grant payout time. Formally employed persons in poor communities
may spend some of their income on goods or services at microenterprises, but for everything above the most convenient or specialized
purchases, there are formal supermarkets and shops reasonably close by.
This inauspicious context is illustrated by the fact that while
nearly 40% of employment in the South African retail trade sector is
in microenterprises,2 the contribution of microenterprises to
national retail trade output is only 2.3% (SAIRR, 2001). Some 53%
of South African personal services employment is in microenterprises, but these contribute less than 10% of the sector’s output.
Only about 8% of microenterprises are involved in manufacturing.
Overall, microenterprises provide nearly 20% of South Africa’s
“jobs” but contribute only 5% to the gross domestic product (GDP).
The national microenterprise income share is divided amongst
nearly 8 million South Africans, which is 17% of the population.
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These economic factors lead to very low incomes in the
microenterprise sector (SARB, n.d.; SSA, n.d.). The average annual
income in this sector is a little over US$1,000, which is about 46%
of the most commonly used South African poverty datum line (at
US$1 = R8). Annual per capita income for persons in households
whose income derives mainly from microenterprise is about
US$250. This is well below the annual per capita poverty line of
US$400, not to mention the ubiquitous “a-dollar-a-day” regarded
by some as the benchmark of absolute poverty. This is not to imply
that microenterprise is the only source of income in such households.
Many South African households dependent on microenterprise
income also receive some form of state grant via a resident pensioner
or the childcare grant system.

MFIs in South Africa
South African MFIs straddle the country’s first and second
economies. Although their clients are drawn from the poor communities and microenterprises described above, their staffs are solidly
emplaced in a middle-class material environment little different
from developed countries. This applies to all MFI staff, regardless of
race. South African racial issues do have an effect on MFIs, however.
In a peculiar but understandable paradox, South Africa’s push for
affirmative action and rapid black advancement means that skilled
black MFI personnel are highly marketable, particularly in the
state and private sectors, putting upward pressure on their salaries
and leading to fairly rapid turnover. Yet, for reasons of equity and
historical redress, donors and the government often disfavor available
white personnel.
South African pro-poor MFIs are mainly rural, but because
South Africa has very few small-scale cash farmers, their clients are
not agricultural microenterprises. They are mainly petty traders,
dressmakers, traditional brewers, etc. in rural villages. Life and work
in remote rural areas, with client groups at great distances from one
another, means an additional premium for MFI managers wanting
to attract and retain good staff.
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South Africa’s educational system at all levels is poorly prepared
to produce the kind of skills and aptitudes needed by MFIs. Of the
country’s 30-plus technical colleges and universities, only two provide
any microcredit-related training and both programs are relatively
new. Development courses at South African universities tend to be
theoretical, general, and geared to urban issues such as trade unionism.
Because there are so few MFIs, there is no microfinance-specific
labor “market” and, consequently, most training takes place on the
job. An ever-present problem is poaching of staff by other MFIs,
NGOs, private firms, and the state.
Overall, the distance between South African MFI staff and their
clients, both economic and social, is greater than in many countries,
particularly in Asia. In India and Bangladesh, for example, it is not
uncommon to find MFI clients with a fair amount of education and
self-confidence. South Africa’s low-income communities contain few
people with ready-made skills to help manage microcredit solidarity
groups. This places a greater burden on the MFIs to provide training
and support for their clients.

The South African MFIs
Table 1 lists four South African NGOs that extend microcredit to
poor and very poor households for microenterprise purposes. All
these institutions use a group-lending methodology, although there
are significant differences between them in this regard. All claim to
be trying to reach very poor households, although only one employs
a targeting methodology.
From Table 1 it can be seen that:
• The average age of the South African group is 6 years, compared
with 5.6 for all MFIs, but 8 years for African MFIs.
• The average client base of 10,096 is comparable to the global
average of 11,698, but it is significantly lower than the African
average of 18,640.
• The average South African portfolio is US$867,348, compared
with a global MFI average of US$3,859,273 and an African
average of US$3,168,759. This puts the South African group
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Table 1: Selected South African MFIs, 2003
Name

Age Offices

Staff

Active Women Average
borrowers borrowers
first
loan

Average
Average
loan balance/GNI
balance
per capita

Beehive

8

3

54

5,892

75%

$125

$111

3.93

FINCA

3

1

50

1,386

96%

$125

$151

5.34

Marang

2

19

145

15,836

95%

$120

$76

2.69

11

11

100

17,242

98%

$67

$82

2.89

SEF

on the boundary between the MBB’s definitions of “small” and
“medium” in the African context.
• The average balance outstanding of US$105 per client is considerably lower than the global average of US$453, but closer to
the African average of US$181. The more relevant comparison,
however, is to the MBB’s “Africa small/low” peer group, with an
average of US$54.
• The average loan balance as a percentage of GNI per capita is
3.7%, compared with 15.3% for the Africa small/low group.
However, this is not so much indicative of outreach performance
as of South Africa’s high per capita GNI. Thus, a small—even
exceptionally small—microloan in the South African context is
double the size, in absolute terms, of those given by the Africa
small/low peer group.

South African MFI Benchmark Performance
The MBB’s benchmarks include: outreach, profitability and sustainability, income, expense, portfolio quality and efficiency, and
productivity measures. In this article, we are interested in outreach,
expense, efficiency, and productivity. Tables 2 to 6 compare the results
for the South African MFI group against five categories of MFIs:
1. Africa all: All African MFIs, regardless of size, target market,
methodology, region, etc.
2. Africa small/low: African MFIs with a loan portfolio of
US$800,000 or less and with an average loan balance of US$150
or less
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3. World all: All MFIs, regardless of size, target market, methodology, region, etc.
4. World solidarity: All MFIs using solidarity group-lending
methodologies.
5. World low end: All MFIs with an average loan balance of
US$150 per client.
The following is clear from Table 2:
• South African MFIs are at the bottom of the scale in terms of
average number of clients and the number of offices serving
them. However, in both respects they are closer to the global
average and to their African peer group.
• The South African group operates from a much lower asset base
than all other categories, except their African peer group.
• The South African group carries a staff complement on par
with the global average, but nearly double that of their African
peer group.
• The South African group carries a much lower absolute loan
portfolio on average than all categories of MFIs, except their
African peer group, which is a little over half the size of the
South African group.
Table 3 shows that:
• The average loan balance per client for the South African MFI
group is on the low end of the scale, even in African terms, except
for their direct peer group of small African MFIs targeting the
very poor.
• As noted above, there is enormous disparity in terms of average
balance per client as a percentage of per capita GNI. The South
African MFIs are the lowest of any category—the only group in
single figures—and only one quarter of the level of their African
peer group.
• The South African group has the highest percentage of women
clients.
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120

$867,348

$3,168,759

$5,147,848

90

$1,259,494

18,640

91

3.7

Average balance as a percentage
of GNI per capita

$105

SA

Percentage of women clients

Average outstanding
balance per client

Item

82

7

Africa all

10,096

8.5

6

SA

55.3

77

$181

Africa all

Table 3: Outreach of South African MFIs

Outstanding
principal balance

Total assets

Staff

Active clients

Offices

Age in years
(average)

Item

Table 2: Scale of South African MFIs

15.3

86

$54

Africa
small/low

$488,053

$804,756

47

11,678

11

6

Africa
small/low

45.3

61

$453

World all

$3,859,273

$5,735,499

101

11,698

15

8

World all

46.0

73

$371

World
solidarity

$9,131,991

$12,267,063

278

47,884

41

8

World
solidarity

16.0

86

$135

World
low end

$3,725,355

$5,369,487

222

42,520

110
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Table 4: Expense
Item
Total expense/
total assets
Operating expense/
total assets
Financial expense/
total assets

SA

Africa
all

Africa
small/low

World
all

World
solidarity

World
low end

101%

39%

50%

30%

31%

39%

84%

31%

37%

19%

22%

28%

11.7%

2.6%

2.5%

4.5%

3.0%

4.9%

Loan loss provision/
total assets

4.8%

2.5%

3.6%

2.2%

2.3%

2.8%

Personnel expense/
total assets

52%

15%

19%

11%

13%

15%

Nonstaff admin.
expense/total
assets

32%

16%

19%

9%

9%

14%

In Table 4 we see the following:
• In every expense category, the South African MFI group is significantly out of line with other categories of MFI. Total expenses,
operating expenses, and nonstaff administrative expenses as a percentage of total assets are roughly double those of the African
small/low peer group.
• Financial expense as a percentage of total assets is also significantly higher than other MFI groupings, reflecting South Africa’s
high real interest rates.
• Personnel expense as a percentage of total assets is the most
seriously inflated ratio in the case of South Africa, being 5
times the world average, 3.4 times the African average, and
nearly 3 times that of the African peer group.
From Table 5 the following can be seen:
• Unsurprisingly, given their relatively small scale, their inflated
staffing and expense ratios, and the low average loan balances in
proportion to per capita GNI, operating expense ratios in the
South African MFI group are radically out of line with all other
categories of MFI.
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Table 5: Financial Efficiency
Item

SA

Operating expense/
loan portfolio

Africa
all

142%

Operating expense
per client

$161

56%
$58

Personnel expense/
loan portfolio

91%

Average personnel
expense as a multiple
of per capita GNI

2.3

World
all

World
solidarity

World
low end

72%

27%

37%

50%

$35

27%

11.6

Africa
small/low

$89

$93

$56

35%

15%

22%

26%

7.4

5.5

7.0

5.1

• The category most divergent from global and African norms is
personnel expense as a percentage of the loan portfolio. The
South African figure is 6 times the global average, 3.5 times the
African figure, and 2.5 times the norm of their African peer
group.
• What is striking, however, given its personnel expense ratios, is
that the South African group performs better than any other
category of MFI in terms of average personnel expense as a
multiple of per capita GNI. The South African group is less
than half the global average, 20% of the African average, and
one third of the African peer group average. Compared with
other MFIs, South African MFIs pay relatively low salaries in
terms of the local economy. Again, this is due largely to the
country’s high average GNI per capita.

Table 6: Productivity
Item

SA

Africa
all

Africa
small/low

World
all

World
solidarity

Borrowers per
staff member

101

198

247

128

155

227

Borrowers per
loan officer

150

413

462

308

356

682

Loan officers as
a percentage of
personnel

69

42

41

45

49

49
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Table 6 illustrates the following points:
• The South African MFI group performs poorly against other
groups in terms of borrowers per staff member and performs
particularly poorly against its African peer group. This is driven
by especially poor performance in terms of borrowers per loan
officer—half the global average and only one third of the level
of the African peer group.
• Offsetting this somewhat, the South African MFIs are less top
heavy than most other MFIs when considering the ratio of loan
officers to total personnel.

The “Salary Burden”
One of the challenges of performing a benchmarking analysis using
performance ratios is to disentangle the relationships between various
numerators and denominators. For example, the relationship
between South African MFIs’ expenses and their loan portfolios is
poor compared with other MFI groups. Is this situation due to inefficiency, a high-cost environment, a high degree of societal income
inequality, or all three?
In the South African case, three things stand out:
• The extremely low average loan balance relative to per capita GNI
• A low average personnel expense as a multiple of per capita GNI
• The poor productivity of loan officers, which leads to inferior
overall physical productivity per staff member
Christen (2000) employs a useful measure that encapsulates all
three factors. This is the “salary burden,” computed as follows:
Average staff salary as a multiple of GNI per capita
Average number of
clients/staff member

X

Average outstanding balance
per client/GNI per capita

This measure exposes the proportion of the MFI’s portfolio that
each employee “represents” in terms of the national economy. The
higher the figure, the higher the proportion of an MFI’s portfolio
and operating revenue that is consumed by its personnel costs. The
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qualification “in terms of the local economy” is critical. While it is
useful to know the absolute level of average salaries and loan balances,
what is really important is the relationship between the two in any
given context. By comparing the two controlled for per capita
GNI, “salary burden” is a way to see the effects of societal income
inequality and poor productivity.
Compared with salaries at other MFIs, average South African
MFI salaries in terms of per capita GNI (i.e., the local economy) are
low (Table 7). Yet, average South African loan balances per client in
terms of per capita GNI are exceptionally low. Combined with poor
physical productivity, this produces a situation in which, even though
South African MFI staff are paid relatively poorly in local income
terms, a low relative portfolio income base still makes it difficult to
cover personnel costs.

Table 7: The Salary Burden
Item

SA

Average salary
as a multiple of
GNI per capita
2.3
Average loan
balance per client/
GNI per capita
3.7%
Average clients/
staff member
101
Salary burden

61%

Africa
all

Africa
small/low

World
all

11.6

7.4

5.5

7.0

5.1

55.3%

15.3%

45.3%

46.0%

16.0%

198

247

128

155

227

11%

20%

9%

World
solidarity

10%

World
low end

14%

Table 8: Salary Burden Scenarios
Item

SA
Actual

SA with
SA with
Africa
adjusted
adjusted small/low
loan size productivity

Average salary as a multiple
of GNI per capita

2.3

2.3

Average balance per client/
GNI per capita

3.7%

15.3%

Average clients/
staff member

101

Salary burden
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61%

101
15%

2.3
3.7%
247
25%

World
low end

7.4

5.1

15.3%

16.0%

247

227

20%

14%
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In considering the salary burden, which is more important in the
South African MFI context—a low average loan balance or poor
physical productivity? Table 8 considers two hypothetical scenarios.
In one, the average loan balance per client in relation to per capita
GNI is adjusted upwards to the Africa small/low peer group level. This
produces a salary burden of 15%. The second holds loan balances
constant while varying productivity upwards to match the African
small/low peer group. This produces a salary burden of 25%. This
suggests that the contribution of South Africa’s small average loan
balance per client contributes more to the salary burden, but only
marginally; and the two are more or less equally problematic.
An average South African MFI salary burden of 15 to 25% cent
would still be high in global terms, but much closer to the African peer
group and to the global low-end microcredit sector than at present.

Obstacles to Productivity in the
South African Context
The MFIs surveyed are all committed to reaching the very poor in the
South African context. Therefore, we can assume they would resist
increasing their average per client loan balances and would rather
concentrate on improving productivity. What are the obstacles to
improved productivity in the South African context?
• Distances and mobility: Most South African pro-poor MFIs
operate in rural areas, with client groups separated by large
tracts of commercial farmland and game reserves. This is very
different from the situation in densely populated parts of Asia,
particularly Bangladesh, whose MFI sector skews global benchmarks through sheer size. The South African scenario is not so
different from other African countries, but many African MFIs
are urban-based and this means the African benchmark figures
show higher physical productivity than South Africa. One
important factor is the lack of independent transportation for
many South African MFI loan officers, who generally rely on an
inadequate public transportation system, taxis, and their feet to
reach their clients.
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• Penetration levels: In a situation of relative remoteness, it would
be logical for South African MFIs to try to develop as many
clients in each village as possible. However, this is difficult
because of both the dearth of opportunities for microenterprise in
South Africa, as explained in the first section, and the similarity
of opportunities that do exist. One MFI that has considered this
issue carefully concludes that it can sustainably reach no more
than one in five households in very poor communities. Thus, in
a (large) village of a thousand households, even if a single loan
officer reached every possible household (200), he or she would
still be below relevant global and African measures of loan officer
productivity (350 to 450 households).
• Need for greater client training input: A factor rooted in South
Africa’s apartheid past is the low level of literacy, business skills,
and general self-confidence in the rural communities. Women
are particularly disempowered, given traditional patriarchal
social structures, and small enterprise is not as much a tradition for them as in other parts of Africa. This means that MFI
loan officers spend a significant amount of their time assisting
very poor women to develop the basic self-confidence and
skills to run their businesses—not necessarily through training
but through general encouragement and social empowerment.
• Skill levels and attitudes to work: South African MFI loan officers
are typically right out of high school or have a few years of postsecondary education. Many are drawn from the ranks of
unemployed teachers. They tend to be young, and many lack
life skills and a mature work ethic; they consider their MFI
jobs neither as a career nor as particularly “developmental.”
The hard work involved in rural microcredit and the attractions of city life lead many to jump at the first opportunity for
alternative employment.
• Labor relations: South Africa has a generally combative labor relations environment. Trade unions helped overthrow the apartheid
regime and some MFIs are unionized. Even those that are not
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must comply with restrictive employment legislation that
makes it difficult to fire underperforming staff. There have been
a number of strikes at South African MFIs.
• Management inexperience: South African MFI loan officers share
responsibility for their productivity with management, who
decide operational, human resource, and strategic planning
issues. Given the country’s small MFI sector, there is a very
small pool of experienced top-level MFI managers and many
mid-level managers are still learning the ropes. Management
turnover is particularly damaging in such a context, because
most replacements must learn by doing rather than bring propoor microcredit skills with them to the post.
• Undermanagement: While South African MFIs have a significantly higher ratio of loan officers to management and administration staff than do other MFIs, this may contribute to low
productivity because of insufficient supervision of loan officers.
Low productivity might tempt MFI managers to employ more
loan officers to increase their portfolios, thus reinforcing the
undermanagement problem.
• Relative salary levels: Are South African MFIs compensating for
poor productivity and relatively high non–loan officer salaries by
keeping loan officer salaries low in comparison to the salaries of
management and administration staff? There is some evidence
that this is so—but this is ultimately self-defeating, as income
inequality within an MFI would tend to undermine loan officer
morale.
• Lack of appropriate support: At present, South Africa lacks a
coordinated source of capacity-building resources for the
NGO microcredit sector. The state has yet to grasp the nettle
of capacity development as a precondition for the emergence of
a successful pro-poor microcredit sector, and microcredit
NGOs are left largely to their own devices.
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Analysis and Implications
What Is the Significance of Income Inequality?
Some might question whether loan size as a percentage of per capita
GNI is a meaningful measure in the South African context. It is selfevident that this figure will be low compared with that of most
developing countries. Because South African MFIs are not lending
to the middle class, it might seem more useful to compare loan balances to average incomes in the communities where their clients live
rather than an average for the entire society.
This objection is only relevant, however, if we are interested in
assessing poverty outreach, by comparing clients of South African
MFIs with clients of MFIs elsewhere, which is not the purpose of
this study. Here, we wish to understand how income differentials
between South African MFI staff and clients affect MFIs’ ability to
attain sustainability.
All other things being equal (including average salaries and
interest rates), the smaller the average loan, the more clients are
required per MFI employee to cover personnel costs. As other things
are almost never equal, per capita GNI is useful to compare such
relationships across different economies. South African MFI salary
levels are contextually low compared with the selected benchmarks,
but average client loans are, again contextually speaking, extraordinarily small. This leads to a very high salary burden. To be very poor
in South Africa means to have an absolute income similar to—even
below—that of very poor people in other developing countries,
while South African MFI staff members are drawn or pushed
towards relatively higher income requirements than their foreign
colleagues. The average South African MFI loan size as a percentage
of per capita GNI is indispensable to assess the client side of this
equation.
Salaries and Productivity
South African MFI managers, wanting to reach the very poor but
under pressure to achieve break-even, are in an unhappy situation.
They could compensate for the salary burden by offering compara-
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tively low salaries (as some do), but this would tend to reinforce
poor productivity, poor labor relations, and high turnover. They
could try to increase productivity—specifically the number of clients
per staff member—to exceptional levels, with salaries to match.
However, it is unlikely that this can be accomplished in South Africa’s
young microfinance sector, with inexperienced staff, a limited market
for replacements, and strong competition for suitable staff from other
MFIs, the government, NGOs, and the private sector. In such a situation, highly productive staff would tend to have their salaries bid
up beyond what the client end of the market could afford to support
through interest payments. Put a different way, MFI salary levels are
an exogenous variable, beyond the control of MFI managers.
In the private sector, the options in such a situation are quite
straightforward: innovate new production techniques, find new
products to produce and sell, or close down. South Africa is an
unlikely source of methodological microcredit innovation for the
very poor. Indeed, aside from a few trailblazers (most notably the SEF
of Limpopo Province), it has demonstrated remarkable slowness in
experimenting with existing methodologies. Even fairly obvious
adjustments (e.g., independent transport for loan officers) are
adopted slowly and cautiously. Far more common than methodological innovation has been “mission drift” towards better-off
clients.

Is Microcredit Appropriate for
Poverty Eradication in South Africa?
What about new products—ones that rearrange the cost-revenue
relationship? If salary levels are exogenous and the South African
pro-poor microcredit NGO sector is unlikely to innovate new
microlending techniques, this is the only other option besides closure.
There are three broad forms of microfinance intervention
available to South African NGOs with a poverty-alleviation focus:
individual microcredit, group microcredit, and supported Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs). By contrast,
deposit taking is illegal for non-bank institutions in South Africa.
Individual microcredit is demonstrably too expensive for very poor
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households, and there are no examples of successful South African
MFIs reaching the very poor this way.
South Africa has thousands of ASCAs and several initiatives
that link them into larger networks, but to date there has been little
serious work on their microfinance potential. The NGOs active in
this area concentrate on savings and credit as a vehicle for social
mobilization rather than access to savings and credit services per se.
As a result, their performance in providing access to small-scale
credit for business, emergencies, and consumption, based on intermediated group savings, is poor. Their main effectiveness as poverty
alleviation strategies lies in the development of social capital in savings
and credit groups and in their larger networks. In this respect, some
South African savings and credit networks have been remarkably
successful.
Nevertheless, it is notable that elsewhere in the southern
African region, some NGOs have been successful in encouraging the
formation and functioning of ASCA networks providing meaningful
local-level financial services that directly improve the poverty situations of their members. The cost of supporting these groups is a tiny
fraction of the cost of microcredit programs, with comparative perclient cost ratios of 1:100 common. In other parts of the world
(notably South and Southeast Asia), NGOs and parastatals have
successfully provided external credit lines to functioning ASCA
networks, enabling them to have a significant impact on poverty
without using NGO-to-client microcredit.
There is another reason to consider ASCAs in the South African
context. The opening section outlined the challenges facing
microenterprise in South Africa due to the presence of a highly
efficient formal sector alongside extreme poverty. This prevents
microenterprises from adding value sustainably in productive enterprise as well as many retail activities. In this context, the best use
of microfinance may be to assist households to reduce their vulnerability by smoothing incomes through locally-based savings and
credit, rather than microcredit for microenterprise.
As ASCAs have the potential to not only deliver microfinance
services, but also create social capital amongst target communities—
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thus creating the possibility of a more radical approach to poverty
that goes beyond reliance on market solutions—it may be time for
South African NGOs to consider this approach more seriously.

Summary and Conclusions
Because of the country’s extreme income inequality, to be very
poor in the South African context means to have a real income,
and thus capacity for borrowing, more or less on par with MFI
clients elsewhere on the African continent. But to be a South African
MFI staff member means to have socially determined expenses and
thus income expectations on par with the developed world, or at
least much higher than elsewhere in Africa and Asia.
The income and social inequality thus makes operating a
microcredit business in South Africa unusually expensive relative to
other developing countries, and there is little that South African
MFIs can do about it. This is so even though MFIs are paying their
loan officers much less, relative to the local economy, than most MFIs
globally and in Africa. However, it is clear that South African
MFIs could go much further to improve their physical productivity.
Until this is attempted, it is impossible for them to say with certainty what special consideration they might need or deserve.
This problem raises the question of whether microcredit is an
appropriate solution to poverty in South Africa. Substituting the
voluntary input of savings and credit group members for the paid
exertions of professional fieldworkers has the potential not only to
improve microfinance performance, but also to create social capital
that can be used to address poverty in a variety of ways.

Notes
1. At current prices, in mid-2003. Following MicroBanking Bulletin practice, this
and other figures in this document have not been adjusted for purchasing power parity.
For full details of the MicroBanking Bulletin approach to benchmarking, see
http://www.mixmbb.org. (US$1 = R8 in 2002, when this study was undertaken.)
2. Because they are based on the number of employees rather than turnover, official South African microenterprise figures include small but high-value first economy
firms as well as second economy microenterprises.
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